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Abstract:   
Research aims: Investment plays an essential role in the business growth of a 
company and the economy to develop more broadly. The role makes each 
institution implement investment targets and takes all actions to support the 
realization of investment targets. This study proves that foreign investors can 
change the investment behavior of companies and the interaction among 
decisions.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The study used a dynamic panel data analysis 
method based on the financial statements of 100 manufacturing companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX).  
Research findings: Increasing foreign ownership does not always reduce agency 
problems. The analysis shows that the level of share ownership of foreign 
investors changed the company’s investment behavior. These results indicate 
that there are different agency problems in different ownership level of foreign 
investors. 
Theoretical contribution/Originality: This study provides a new perspective and 
empirical evidence that the relationship between agency problems and foreign 
share ownership is not static. 
Practitioner/Policy implication: This study analyzes the effect of the composition 
of foreign investors on the allocation of corporate funds by investigating capital 
asset investment and current asset investment interactions. This research 
contributes to the firm's ability to control its own goals. 
Research limitation/Implication: This research has not considered the company's 
risk characteristics related to the type of industry. For further research 
development, it is necessary to consider the company's risk characteristics to 
enhance the analysis. 






This research provides  a new perspective of agency theory 
implementation in explaining investment decisions in conditions in 
emerging and ineffective markets such as Indonesia. Investment plays an 
essential role in a company's business growth and economy. The 
magnitude of an investment role makes each institution implement 
investment targets and does any actions to support the realization of  
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investment targets. Investment decisions can impact the company's value (Karuna, 
2007, Laksmana & Yang, 2015).   The implementation of investment is significant for the 
company’s achievement and sustainability in the future, so the impact obtained 
depends on predictions and decisions made by the company’s managers. Investment is 
closely related to agency theory that founded on seven underlying assumptions: 
personal interests, conflicting goals, bounded rationality, information asymmetry, 
efficiency advantages, risk aversion, and information as a commodity (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Haaskjold, Andersen, Lædre, & Aarseth, 2019). 
 
When companies allocate more funds for investment in current assets to increase the 
sales and value of the company, the operational risk of the company will automatically 
increase (Michalski, 2008). In operational activities, when the company decides to invest 
in current assets to increase sales, the company sacrifices the opportunity to invest in 
fixed assets to increase the company's operational capacity in capturing opportunities to 
increase sales in the future (Cheatham, 1989). When a company gets an investment 
opportunity, there will be agency problems due to the difference in perspective 
between management and the owner of the company in interpreting opportunities and 
risks in making investment decisions.  
 
The existence of foreign investment in companies in Indonesia is an inevitable 
phenomenon in economic globalization. Investment decisions are inseparable from the 
role of corporate governance (Guariglia & Yang, 2016). In the study of Chen, Sun, and Xu 
(2016) on the relationship between the level and type of ownership with the allocation 
of investment funds, the type and level of ownership of a company have an essential 
role in determining the investment behavior of a company. According to Chen, El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, & Wang (2017), foreign institutional stock ownership makes different levels 
of asymmetric information and agency problems, which can also make a difference in 
investment behavior. Foreign institutions ownership will mitigate asymmetric agency 
and information problems by improving transparent corporate and financial 
governance. Based on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), companies classified as foreign direct ownership companies are companies that 
have foreign ownership levels above 10% or more and have the power and voting rights 
that can influence company decisions. Figure 1 explains that the average investment 
value of companies with foreign ownership under 10% is higher than foreign share 




Figure 1 The average of fixed asset investment  
(ratio of total fixed assets at the beginning of the year)  
for companies with foreign share ownership above 10% and below 10% 
Source: IDX (2016, Edited) 
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The average investment data in the above figure shows that investment in companies 
with foreign ownership more than 10% has a different pattern and in specific years, has 
a lower average compared to companies that have a level of foreign share ownership 
below 10 %. This pattern shows an indication that companies with foreign ownership 
above 10% are more careful in managing their investments.  This argument is in line 
with studies that argue that foreign investors show higher control over investment 
decisions. On the other hand, some literature shows empirical evidence that the 
presence of foreign investors will increase investment, such as the findings of Boubakri, 
Cosset, and Saffar (2013) which proves that foreign ownership has a positive 
relationship with corporate investment decision making, with an increase in investment 
outcomes. 
 
Mutlu, Essen, Peng, and Saleh (2016) and Bruce, Buck, and Main (2005) stated that the 
application of agency theory is doubtful to be applied to developing companies in the 
context of non-Anglo Saxon culture and to companies in developing markets (Young, 
Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) also clarified 
that in an inefficient market, agency theory would not produce consistent results. Hill 
and Jones (1992) added that agency theory could function based on the assumption that 
markets are efficient and can adjust to occurring changes quickly. Currently, Indonesia 
has shown as an inefficient market (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). With research results that 
do not show consistent results, different approaches needed in conducting studies 
related to investment decisions and their relationship with agency theory in emerging 
markets such as Indonesia. Furthermore, according to Andrianto and Mirza (2016) 
Indonesian stock market has been classified as weak form efficiency that they analyzed 
by using daily stock price data collected from the LQ45 Index, Jakarta Islamic Index (JII), 
and Kompas 100 Index during the periods of 2013 until 2014. The statistical testing 
conducted and the results are as follows: the flow of daily stock price is random move, 
and there is no correlation of stock price movement between the current day and 
previous days (Andrianto & Mirza, 2016). 
 
The above description shows that by further examining the effect of the proportion of 
foreign share ownership on investment decisions in manufacturing companies in the 
context of non-anglo-Saxon culture and inefficient market conditions in Indonesia, it can 
provide a new perspective on the application of agency theory in analyzing agency 
problems in an agency company. The difference between current asset investment and 
fixed asset investment is that the proportion of current assets can change in the short 
term in line with changes in the business cycle (Cheatham, 1989). 
 
This study analyzes the effect of the composition of foreign investors on the allocation 
of corporate funds by investigating capital asset investment and current asset 
investment interactions. Such analysis has not become the focus of previous researches, 
which makes this research is vital. This research contributes to the firm's ability to 
control its own goals. The capital asset investment discussed in this paper refers to long-
term investment, while current asset investment refers to short-term investment. 
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Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Strategic investment decision is described by researchers as important decision (Butler, 
Davies, Pike, & Sharp, 1991; Lu & Heard, 1995; Schoemaker, 1993), and have a 
significant impact on the organization as a whole (Carr & Tomkins, 1996) as well as 
significant potential to improve company’s performance (Butler et al., 1991; Carr & 
Tomkins, 1996; Cauwenbergh, Durinck, Martens, Laveren, & Bogaert, 1996). Cossette 
highlights the ambiguity of the term and notes that "strategic" means "important" or 
"not secondary" (Cossette, 2004). They do not emphasize the importance of the decision 
for an organization, yet a more precise definition indicates that strategic decision is a 
decision regarding the goals, domains, technology, and structure of a company or 
decision regarding the development of a company through technology market products. 
 
In modern corporations, some efforts involve several stakeholders, such as managers, 
workers, shareholders, and debt holders, in developing the company together. Different 
interests in each stakeholder that was potentially causing conflict, and it has to be 
resolved by the companies. The conflicts between shareholders and managers create 
agency problems. Agency problems arise when agents work for principals. Agency costs 
occur when managers do not try to maximize the value of the company, and 
shareholders incur costs to supervise managers and limit their actions (Brealey, Myers, 
& Allen, 2011). 
 
Conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders have 
considered as one of the most important corporate governance issues in the Asian stock 
market. There are essential organizational and behavioral differences between 
companies in emerging markets and those in developed markets. A top-down approach 
proposed to analyze how critical institutional forces shape the structure and policies of 
companies in emerging markets. This approach can be conducted by selectively 
reviewing previous research in identifying the quality of governance and ownership as a 
crucial institutional force in shaping corporate finance and governance in developing 
markets (Fan, Wei, & Xu, 2011). 
 
Investment sensitivity to free cash flow increased at the level of poor corporate 
governance. Moreover, according to Francis, Hasan, Song, & Waisman (2013) states that 
the sensitivity of free cash flow will escalate whenever the company has weak 
management. Firms' over-investment is related to current free cash flow, and over-
investment is more likely to occur in firms with positive free cash flows (Chen et al., 
2016). This sensitivity reflects the possibility of a lack of supervision on management and 
companies that have poor governance and difficulties in external funding, so they focus 
on internal funding. Corporate governance influences the determinants of investment 
sensitivity for internal cash flow. The level of corporate governance has a positive effect 
on access to funding. The result of this study supports the agency theory and suggests 
the existence of problem incentives and monitor costs of managerial actions that can 
lead to funding friction and affect corporate investment behavior (Francis, et al., 2013). 
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Research Method 
 
This study used a dynamic panel data regression method to explain the effect of foreign 
investor ownership on the interaction of capital and current asset investment decisions 
in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2018 
by considering the institutional ownership. This study used annual data on financial 
statements of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 
from 2007 to 2018. The number of samples is taken from 77 manufacturing companies, 
considering the criteria that the company has never been delisted and used one 
currency in its financial statements along the periods. 
 
The regression model developed from the previous study (Chen et al., 2017; Nugroho, 
Firdaus, Andati, & Irawan, 2018). The model was adopted because it could describe the 
typical conditions in Indonesia, such as different periods of payment of taxes and 
dividends that would affect cash flow patterns. The model development is in the form of 
additional levels of foreign ownership that are more diverse in the range of 0% to 90% at 
10% intervals. This research conducted to investigate the pattern of investment 
behavior related to different levels of foreign investor share ownership in Indonesia 
manufacturing companies (at low to high concentration of foreign ownership). The basic 
model is used to determine the effect of the control variable to agency theory. Then the 
investment model is used to investigate the composition of foreign investors in 
strengthening or weakening the relationship between capital asset investment and 











The variable of capital asset investment (I) is the ratio of capital expenditure to fixed 
assets at the beginning of the year. The use of capital expenditure on fixed assets at the 
beginning of the year is essential as a proxy for capital asset investment. We compared 
the proportion of fixed assets to total assets in order to capture capital asset investment 
so that it can measure the company's decision to replace assets which its economic life 
is expired and the addition of fixed assets. Tobin Q (TQ) measured from market value in 
equity–book value in equity and book value of assets) divided by book value on assets, 
whereas cash flow (CF) is the operational cash flow divided by the book value of the 
beginning of the year. Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Sale is the 
ratio of sales to fixed assets at the beginning of the year. Current asset investment 
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(CATAR) is the ratio between current assets and total assets. D_Own is the Dummy 
variable for foreign ownership. If firm foreign ownership level is higher than a certain 
level (above 0% to 90%) will be given a value of 1 (one) and 0 (zero) for otherwise. 
 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
In order to understand the risk perspective of the use of funds by companies in capital 
asset investment and current asset investments, it is necessary to analyze the 
composition of funding sources, especially that comes from external funding (e.i debt). 
Since debt forces companies to be prudent in the use of existing funds. In the allocation 
of funding originating from debt, current asset investments certainly have lower 
consequences compared to capital asset investments because current assets more easily 
converted into cash. 
 
In Figure 2, we can analyze the ratio of long term liabilities and short term liabilities to 
total assets. The data of long term liabilities ratio show a declining trend, along with the 
increase of foreign ownership shares. Long term liabilities continue to decline to the 
level of foreign ownership concentration at 80% and then begin to increase. This 
increase in loans for the long term after 80% shows that companies are starting to 
allocate funds from debt for long-term interests (fixed assets). The decline in long-term 
liabilities expected to affect the company's ability to make long-term investments. 
Leverage not only reduces the level of investment but also the composition of 
investments (Hennessy, 2004). The reduction in investment will worsen the condition of 
long-term assets. If the company has potential growth opportunities, it will reduce the 





Figure 2 The Ratio of Long Term Liabilities of Manufacturing Companies in Indonesia 
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Short term liabilities ratio shows an increasing trend. Short-term loans continue to 
increase until the concentration level of foreign share ownership reaches 80%. These 
indicate that the company is investing in a short term purpose i.g company operational 
financing. Indonesia manufacturing companies development is one factor for foreign 
investors to maximize company value through the addition of machinery to the 
expansion of company buildings. Foreign investors tend to improve the condition of the 
company before investing (in the proportion of long term liabilities). Correspondingly,  
Nugroho & Suk (2019) stated that developing countries tend to choose short-term debt 
funding rather than long-term debt to reduce problems. 
 
In the ratio movement of long term liabilities and short term liabilities, there is a similar 
pattern in the composition of ownership above 0% to above 40%, but after the 
composition of ownership above 50% to above 80%, the pattern tends to be the 
opposite. This trend shows that in general, companies with a composition of foreign 
ownership above 50% to above 80% increase the composition of short-term debt and 
reduce the composition of long-term debt; this indicates that the investor tends to 
demand the management to improve their short-term performance. 
 
From these findings, it is necessary to learn more about whether the behavior of the 
composition of short term and long term debt affected investment decisions and how 
the interaction of capital and current investment decisions. The problem of information 
asymmetry among management, financial institutions, and controlling shareholders will 
cause agency problems in manufacturing companies, which will affect the company's 
investment decisions. Several studies explain that capital investment decisions 
influenced by several important factors, including the investment in the previous year 
(McGrattan, 1999), cash flow (Chen et al., 2016; Jiang, Kim, Nofsinger, & Zhu, 2015) sales 
(Aguerrevere, 2009), and leverage (Firth, Malatesta, Xin, & Xu, 2012). 
 
Table 1 shows the results that provide empirical evidence of agency problems, which are 
shown in the negative relationship between leverage from the previous period and 
capital investment in period t, showing that increasing leverage will make management 
more careful in making capital investments in the following year. The empirical evidence 
is following Jiang et al (2015),  Anwar and Sun (2015) and Aivazian, Ge, and Qiu (2005). 
However, what happens behind this negative relationship must be explored further by 
looking at the relationship with the company's decision in current investment because 
the indication in figure 2 shows there is an increase in short-term liabilities as of the 
composition of foreign shareholders increases at a certain proportion. 
 
Baum, Schäfer, & Talavera (2006) and Fazzari and Petersen (1993) show that corporate 
profitability will increase when using short-term funding, where companies have a high 
dependency on short-term debt related to company profits. The company uses short 
term liabilities as working capital to improve short-term financial performance. On the 
other hand, if a company adopts an aggressive approach to managing short-term 
liabilities, investors will add value to these companies (Afza & Nazir, 2007). The level of 
aggressiveness of the working capital policy only helps create shareholder wealth by 
improving the market performance of the company. 
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Table 1 Estimation Result of Model 1 
Variable Base Model 





CATARit-1  .546892*** 
Cons -.362039*** 
Sargan (Prob) .2364 
Arellano bond M1 (Prob) .0056 
Arellano bond M2 (Prob) .4664 
Note: Symbol *, **, *** indicates significance on 10%,5%,1% 
 
 
The estimation results in Table 1 show that the Current Assets to Total Assets Ratio 
(CATAR) variable has a negative influence on the next period of long term investment 
decisions, following the notion that when investing in the short-term, the company 
sacrifices capital investment decisions in the next period. Current assets to total assets 
ratio (CATAR) reflect the availability of cash, receivables, and inventory, which are the 
most liquid current assets compared to the overall assets owned by the company 
(Saputri, Sulastri, & Bakar, 2016). The existence of liquid assets can be used at any time 
to finance the company's operational needs to generate profits (Syamsuddin, 2007). 
 
When the company has funds and seeks to increase its value, the company will have two 
choices in utilizing the funds. The first alternative is to increase the proportion of current 
investment and decrease the proportion of capital investment, or vice versa. The second 
alternative is to maintain the proportion of current and capital investment. Given the 
relationship between empirical evidence and positive relationships, the increasing 
CATAR in Indonesian manufacturing companies affected capital investment and a 
significant positive influence on the investment. This positive influence happened likely 
because companies are trying to take advantage of opportunities that exist in the 
market to increase their competitiveness with optimizing their operations. 
 
Therefore, by investigating the regression coefficient of the interaction variable between 
CATAR and foreign share ownership indicated by the interaction variable CATAR*Down  
in Table 2, there is an interval of foreign ownership in the range of ownership 
concentration from above 0% to 40% which shows an increasing trend on the variable 
interaction coefficient, but companies with a foreign ownership to level above 70% 
trend on coefficient value are forming a U-shape curve, and when the concentration 
level reaches above 80%. The pattern shows a behavioral change of companies in 
managing their capital and current investments on different levels of foreign ownership. 
 
At concentration level intervals of share ownership by foreign investors above 0% to 
above 40%, there are still manufacturing companies in the sample of companies whose 
foreign investor positions are minority shareholders. At this interval of a concentration 
level of share ownership by foreign investors, a positive trend obtained significantly at 
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the level of share ownership by foreign investors to above 40%. This result shows that 
the existence of national companies where foreign investors are minority shareholders 
influences the regression coefficient. The positive trend of the coefficient of interaction 
variable is an indication that there are companies that tend to use their funds to make 
capital investments, and they do not just focus on current investments. 
 
Table 2 Estimation Result of Model 2 
Variable >0% >10% >20% >30% >40% 
Investmentit-1 .02346743*** .02340757*** .0232598*** .02184833*** .023435*** 
CFit .22229066*** .22176747*** .22270476*** .2175334*** .19245294*** 
TQit-1 .00129024 .00241556 0.00241396 0.00271918 -0.00014911 
Salesit-1 .03962453*** .04078623*** .03958039*** .03907549*** .04172388*** 
Levit-1 -.25291732*** -.26565004*** -.26833568*** -.25813424*** -.25240055*** 
CATARit-1 .98666624*** .89017776*** .93075041*** .70025497*** .25680714*** 
Downit (> 0%) .36497211***     
CATARit-1*Downit (> 0%) -.55877944***     
Downit (> 10%)  .32071321***    
CATARit-1*Downit (> 10%)  -.46068016***    
Downit (> 20%)   .36927229***   
CATARit-1*Downit (> 20%)   -.51497309***   
Downit (> 30%)    .19689898***  
CATARit-1*Downit (> 30%)       -.19072901***   
Downit (> 40%)     -.04110767*** 
CATARit-1*Downit (> 40%)         .42966632*** 
_cons -.63854524*** -.59702588*** -.62676378*** -.49959053*** -.28371396*** 
Sargan (Prob) .4212 0.3950 0.3134 0.3267 0.3661 
Arellano bond M1 (prob) 0.0060 0.0058 0.0059 0.0060 0.0058 
Arellano bond M2 (prob) 0.9736 0.9895 0.9397 0.8841 0.8264 
Variabel >50% >60% >70% >80% >90% 
Investmentit-1 .02527776*** .01930678*** .02104901*** .02250607*** .02252073*** 
CFit .22358517*** .22490981*** .22597407*** .2201802*** .22241594*** 
TQit-1 .00813905*** .00612444*** .00438884* 0.00230673 0.00162304 
Salesit-1 .03078403*** .03346844*** .03657822*** .04092449*** .0404373*** 
Levit-1 -.26919246*** -.27794091*** -.27185514*** -.26778695*** -.2687477*** 
CATARit-1 1.5001893*** 1.1838165*** .90072606*** .50882272*** .56015405*** 
Downit (> 50%) .68043736***     
CATARit-1*Downit (> 50%) -1.3147349***         
Downit (> 60%)  .62809735***    
CATARit-1*Downit(> 60%)   -1.2429983***       
Downit (> 70%)   .49011184***   
CATARit-1*Downit (> 70%)     -.89594962***     
Downit (> 80%)    -0.0409141  
CATARit-1*Downit (> 80%)       .08038831   
Downit (> 90%)     .12418574*** 
CATARit-1*Downit (> 90%)         -.29191583*** 
_cons -.87003027*** -.69432198*** -.54927494*** -.33244891*** -.35663039*** 
Sargan (Prob) 0.2763 0.3708 0.3309 0.3747 0.3145 
Arellano bond M1 (prob) 0.0055 0.0058 0.0055 0.0055 0.0056 
Arellano bond M2 (prob) 0.9492 0.8507 0.9530 0.9924 0.9850 
Note: Symbol *, **, *** indicates significance on standard 10%,5%,1% 
 
Furthermore, at concentration intervals of share ownership by foreigners above 50% to 
above 70%, a pattern change occurs in the regression coefficient. At intervals of 
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concentration levels of share ownership by foreign investors above 50% to above 70%, 





Figure 3 Compilation on Estimated Results of Dynamic Panel Data Models at All Intervals 
of Foreign Ownership Concentration 
 
In Figure 3, the changing trend on the coefficient occurs at the level of concentration of 
share ownership by foreign investors above 50% to above 70%. It reached the lowest 
negative point at the concentration level of share ownership by foreign investors above 
50%. However, this pattern shows a positive trend pattern to the above 80% level. These 
results indicate agency problems at a concentration level of foreign share ownership 
above 50% to above 70%, which are higher than at other levels of ownership. This 
agency problem encourages foreign investors to increase control over management by 
focusing on current investments, as this situation forces management to improve the 
company's current performance. Meanwhile, at the concentration level of foreign 
shareholding above 80%, foreign companies will act as dominant company owners, and 
the positive relationship of the interaction variables is an indication that there are 
companies at the intervals of foreign share ownership that have a tendency to use funds 
owned to make capital investments. They do not only focus on making current 
investments. This result supported by previous data in Figure 2, where at concentration 
level intervals of share ownership by foreign investors above 80% to above 90%, the 
average long-term debt returns to increase. 
 
From the results, this study provides empirical evidence that that agency problem will 
also affect the behavior of capital investment and current investment of the company. 
Foreign investors use current investment mechanisms to exercise control over the 
company's management to force management to deliver current performance results. It 






The different levels of share ownership by foreign investors show different investment 
decisions. This argument is supported by empirical evidence that demonstrated by the 
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effect of control over investment at a certain level. When the proportion of foreign 
share ownership ranges from above 50% to above 70%, investment decisions will focus 
more on short-term investments. Empirical evidence showed that when foreign 
investors begin to become the dominant group of shareholders, they try to control the 
management of the company by focusing more on current investments. The 
phenomenon occurred along with the increasing data on average capital loans. These 
conditions indicate that the level of ownership of foreign investors will be affected by 
control over management in decisions to invest in the short term or long term 
investment. Another control mechanism is needed in the company to prevent over-
investment, but also prevents the company from under-investment and losing the 
opportunity that exists in the market. This research has not considered the company's 
risk characteristics related to the type of industry, for further research development it is 
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